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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACKIE LEE SYDDALL, 
Appelant 
vs. 
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent 
CASE NO. 10950 
BRIEF OF APPEALANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
District Court for Salt LakeCounty, Hon. 
3tewart M. Hanson, Presiding Judge. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The i~ppellant brought a petition in the Third 
Judicial District Court for a writ of habeas 
: corpus against the warden of the Utah State 
Frison, alleging the illegality of his con-
finement on a commitment which was based on a 
1 conviction for burglary obtained without due 
Process of law. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District 
Judge, called the matter, Vivil No. 167509, on 
for hearing the 10th day of March, 1967, and 
having heard both Plaintiff and Defendant took 
said cause under advisement. 
April 13, 1967, an Order denying Plaintiff's 
petition for habeas corpus in Civi~ No. 167509, 
together with the Memorandum Decision was entered 
and filed (R-22). 
April 21, 1967 appellant filed Notice of Appeal 
Designation of Record and AffidaYit of Iapecuniosity 
(R-23, 24, 25). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was originally confined in the 
Utah State Prison pursuant to sentence illpoaed 
November 25, 1955, for the crime of Second Degree 
Burglary. 
Appellent was arrested by REX HUNTSMAN, Sheriff, 
Sevier County, State of Utah, on the 15th day of 
September, 1955, and lodged in the Sevier County 
Jail, where he remained throughout the proceedings. 
2 
complained of in his petition for writ of hab~ 
corpus. Appellant was seventeen (17) years old 
at that time. 
After being in the Sevier County Jail about 
1 twenty-five ( 25) days a warrant issued for 
appellant's arrest, and two days later, on the 
10th day of October, 1955, said warrant was 
served upon appelant and he was taken before the 
Hon. KEN CH .MBERLAIN, presiding judge in the 
Juvenile Court of the Fourth Juvenile District 
(Ex. D-2/Transcript of Docket). A 11Document" was 
typed and appellant was requested to sign, but 
being a Juvenile, a 17-year-old-young, Appellant 
would not sign his name to anything, because of the 
fact that he did not understand the proceedings 
taking place against him (Ex D-1, Fage 2). 
Appellant later learned that he had been reque~ted 
to waive all his Constitutional and Procedural 
Rights and Guarantees. 
October 11, 1955, appeallant was taken before 
the said Juvenile Court, where he was advised that 
! he had been charged with a criminal offense which 
could be transferred to the District Court. The 
3 
court then read the charges to Appellant and, 
subsequently called Sheriff Rex Huntsman to 
testify against him, {Ex. D-1), the sheriff was 
sworn and gave testimony against Appellant. 
Appellant did not cross-examine the Sheriff. 
Appellant was a 17-year-old-youth, without the 
aid of legal counsel. Appellant had never had a 
Preliminary Hearing in his life. Appellant waa 
lost and confused, he had been in jail 25 da7s. 
Appellant was bound over to Diatrict Court to 
stand trial on the aoove mentioned Burglary charge. 
The Records are incomplete; and tho•• available 
are in conflict as to whether or not Pr•liainary 
Hearing and Legal Counsel were in fact waived, the 
"Docment 11 prepared for Appellant ( s signature was 
not signed by Appellant. 
October 11, 1955, the transcript of docket and 
all papers in this matter were transmitted to the 
Sixth Judicial District Court {R-D-2, page 2, 
paragraph 4) • 
October 10, 1955 Appellant was before the 
Sixth Judicial District Court for arraignment and 
Plea. The Information was read and filed. Appellant 
Appellant was never advised that he could b 
sent to Prison, and if fact, was led to believe 
he would be returned to the State Industrial School. 
The fact that Appellant changed his plea six (6) 
times between October 10th and November 23rd shows 
his state of mind---the mind of a 17-year-old youth. 
After being bound over to stand trial in the 
District Court by the Honorable Ken Chamberlain, 
Juvenile Judge, the records show that the Honorable 
Ken Chamberlain appeared for the State of Utah as 
Disctrict Attorney, against Appellant. 
Being incomplete, the records fail to show 
that Appellant appeared before a District Court 
Judge during his first six (6) appearances in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court. On the 23rd day of 
November, Appellant appeared in courr for the seventh 
time, and records show the Honorable John L. Sevy, 
Jr, sentenced him to the Utah State Prison. 
An examination of the records in the instant 
case give evidence to only one fact: the records 
impeach themselves. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appeallant submits the decision of the lower 
court should be reversed and the case be remanded 
for a New Trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS AND 
E~UAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. 
That which law requires and makes essential 
on trial of defendant, charged with felony, cannot 
be dispensed wth, either by consent of defendant 
or by his failure to object to unauthorized methods 
pursued by those in authority. (State v. Mannion, 
l9U. 505, 57 P. 542, 45 LRA 638, 75 Am. St. Rep. 
753). 
Does an illegal arrest--without more--violate 
the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendm.ent Due 
Process? The lower court in denying Appellant's 
petition for habeas corpus says no. The United 
States Supreme Court has said that it does. See 
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01, 
4 L.Ed. 2d 134-38, 80 s.ct. 168, 170 (1959); 
fil.ordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86, 
6 
2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1509, 78 s.ct. 12'+5, i250 (1958-); 
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5, 71 L. Ed. 
505, 508, 47 S. Ct. 250, 251, (192?). Both logic and 
History point to the same di.rectien. •. The Fourth 
Amendment guarantees "The right of the people to 
be secure, " first of all, 11 :1.n taeir per•ona" &11.d 
an unreasonable eeizure of the person. seems to be 
a greater invasion of 1i'ber<ty B.lld privacy tban 
the similar seizure of one' a effeota .. " See ia~t 
at 46-4?; Foote, Safeguards in the Lav of :.Atrn.tt· 
52 N.W.U.L. Rev. 16, 41.-42 (1957). 
Appellant submitB- that be was arres~ lllUi lield 
twenty-five (25} lia.ya wi.thout a warrant »ei.Dc 
issued; that his arrest waa illegal, aa4 :theret"ore; 
"No magistrate .sha:ll have juriaidi.ctioa over, any 
defendant who has been brou«ht before- hia bJ' 
virture of an illega·l arreat. 11 (Jlote.: · 100 11 .. ·Pa. L. 
1 Rev. 1182, 1215 (1952). 
POIN'l' II 
AN INCOMPLETE RECORD IS A DENIAL OF DUE 
PROC;:s;::;;:.; A.N"D E~UAL PROTECTION 'tl!-lERE POST-CON-
VICTION AND/OR APPEAL IS X MATTER -Oi' ·RIGHT• · 
In Utah "an appeal ma1 'be taken -by the d_.. 
fendant, (1) from a final judgment: o~ eoh'riA'ticlllal 
7 
\~' rrom an order made, after judgment, effecting 
the substantial rights of the party." Section 
77-39-3, Utah Code Annoated, 1953. Thue, where 
an appeal is a matter of right exercisable only 
by the defendant, or petition for habeas corpus 
by the defendant, who has means enough to pay for 
a transcript in advance there is a denaial of 
equal proc tion within the meaning of tlle 14th 
Amendment. The reasoning of-the court is that the 
financial ability to pay costs in a4vance b .. re no 
rational relationship to a defettdaat'a·guilt or 
innocence and cannot be used to justify detrlTtng 
defendent of a fair trial or hearing. hrtker- 9 
there is no meaningful dietinctio-ll between a rule 
which would deny the poor the "right to defft4 : 
themsevea in court and one wkich e'ffecti.-Yely 
denies the poo-r -Of an adequate appellate renew, 
or examination of reeor'de in habeaa cerp\le hearing, 
by demanding coats be pain in advan••· (Griftla v. 
lllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
The financil ability to pay bears no-mere 
rational relationship to a defendant'a guilt or 
innocence than does the accident of the terum an4 
neither can be used to jvstify depriving a 
8 
defendant of a fair trial. If appellant had been 
charged with a misdemeanor in the District Court 
he would have been supplied with a verbatim record 
for purposes of post-conviction remedies or appeal, 
since a reporter would have been present during the 
entire trial. Having been charged, however, in 
the Juvenile court he was unable to obtain a com-
plete record. Thus, Appellant was denied due process 
and equal protection within the meaning of the ll+th 
Amendment. It is not sufficient to state that the 
part of the records not lost is sufficient to pro-
vide a clear record from which to exercise the 
right to post-conviction remedies, and/or appeal 
for no one can say that what is missing is 
immaterial without kno :ing exactly what information 
is being discounted. An incomplete record is just 
as bad as no record at all for the testimony or 
evidence which was most clearly prejudicial or 
erroneous affording grounds !or a writ ot habeas 
corpus may very well be that which is lost. There 
is no rational basis for distinguising between 
treatment in the District Court and in the Juvenile 
Court with regard to an adult offender charged with 
9 
a crime for the reason that Appellant was a 
juvenile at that time. 
D:.ie Process 
In a case where the court reporter had died 
prior to completing the transcription of his notes 
and another person was allowed to try and decipher 
the notes with the aid of statements from the Judge 
and prosecutor, in the face of a formal protest 
from the Court Reporter's Association of Los 
Angeles to the effect that there was grave doubt 
that anyone could furnish a usable transcript 
from the notes due to the fact that many portions 
were completely indecipherable, the Supreme Court 
held that an ex parte settlement of the state 
court record violated petitioner's right to proced-
ural due process in not having been represented at 
the hearings either in person or by counsel. The 
order of the court was to remand to the District 
Court to enter an order to allow California a 
reasonable time to perfect the record, petitioner 
being represented at such hearings and that failing 
to do so wtthin six months petitioner should be 
released. The reasoning of the court was the 
iue process £lause of the 14th .Amendment re-
'luired the opportunity for review on a reviewable 
record. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957). 
~n Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), 
the Supreme Court laid down the following guide 
lines as to whether state procedure violates 14th 
Amendment standards of due process: 
"Does it violate those fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice 
which die at the bese of all our 
civil and political institutions?" 
••• Or is it "so acute and shocking 
that our policy will not endure it?" 
The court in PALKO in rejecting the defendant's 
1 claim of double-jeopardy as a bar to a new trial 
reasoned that "if the trial had been infected 
with error adverse to the accused, there might 
have been a review at his instance, and so often ae 
1 necessary to purge the taint. A. reciprocal 
privilege has now been granted the state." ~ 
!.:.._Connecticut, supra. 
In the stand case appellant's contention 
that an incomplete record is a denial of due 
process for purposes of his right to a full and 
complete hearing in habeas corpus proceeding unless 
this court reverse the lower court's judgment and 
grants appellant a new trial. It is a violation of 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice to 
11 
, say that one has a right to post-conviction remedy 
, on the basis of error as shown by the record when 
'the record is incomplete. The very proof of error 
which might have deprived Appellant of due process 
1
may be hidden in the portion which was lost. (See 
; State v. Baum, '+7 Utah 7, 151 Pac 518 ( 1915); and 
"Primarily, interpretation of written document 
I' 
is for trial court, but reviewing court ia not 
~und by trial court's interpretation based on 
extrinsic evidence in which there is some conflict." 
~re Golder' a Estate, 185 P. 2d 54. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ZRRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO DISCHARGE IN HABEAS CORPUS WHERE 
HL .iAS DENI:2;D LEG~U. COUNSEL DURING ORIGINn.L TRIAL 
/\ND CONVICTION. 
Available records show that Appellant was 
Jailed October 7, 1955--.Appellant contenda he was 
anested and jailed September 15 1 1955--andi the 
iarrant was issued October 8, 19551 served October 
Wth, 1955 (Ex. P-10; Tr. 58, 59.) 
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Recital of the record (Ex. D-3) alleges that 
the court appointed J. Vernon Erickson as counsel, 
at the request of Appellant for legal assistance. 
Appellant contends that his mother asked Mr. 
6rickson to see what he could do for Appellant 
(Bx. 35); that Mr. Erickson advised that he had 
talked with the judge, and there was no need to 
be concerned because he would be placed on pro-
bation (Tr 36, 37); Appellant's mother, Mrs. 
Rasmussen, testified that she went and talked with 
Mr. Erickson ('rr. 75), to see if he would bAlp. 
The manner by which Mr. Erickson came to be the 
counsel of record in Appellant's case is unimportant 
at this time, notwithstanding the fa~t that 
Appellant was released from the jail during the 
day time to go and work for Mr. Erickson (Tr. 37). 
The point complained of is that Appellant had no 
lec,al counsel until the 24th day of October, 1955, 
some 17 to 42 days after being arrested and placed 
in jail, subsequently to two (2) pleas of guilty 
and waiver ofpreliminay hearing and legal counsel 
!"he only evidence, if any, ever introduced in an1 
court was the testimony of Rex Huntsman, Sheriff, 
taken on the 10th day of October in the Juvenile 
,~ 
-
Court (Ex. D-2, 3). Appellant was a seventeen 
(17) year old youth; never before had been in a 
District Court, Adding confusion to confusion, 
Ken Chamberlain was Juvenile Judge who bound 
Appelant over to stand trial in Distr~t Court, 
and when Appellant was brought into District Court, 
~en Chamberlain appeared as Prosecutor for the 
State against Appellant. Can it be said that a 
seventeen year old boy could posibly understand 
1 the procedure complained in the instand case? No. 
"Sven the intelligent and educated layman 
has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law. If charged with a crime, 
he is incapable, generally, of determi.Ung 
for himself whether the indictment is good 
or bad. He is unfamiliar tiwth the rules 
of evidence. Left without the aid of 
counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incom-
petant evidence, or evidence irrelevant 
to the issue or otherwise inadmissable. 
iie lacks both the skill and knowlejge 
ltR adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though be have a perfect one. He require• 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step 
in the proceedings against. him. Withou.t 
it, though he is not guilty, he faces the 
danger of vonviction because he doea not 
know how to estalish his innocence. If that 
be true of men of intellignence, how much 
more true of men of ignorance and illit-
erate, or those of feeble intellect." Powel v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 US. 335 (1963) • 
...... .1.ut. (pro tee i.i . .:·'· 
Appellant was a 17 year old boy. His opponent 
was the Honorable Ken Chamberlain, Judge, and 
District Attorney. 
"The Constitutional Rights of an individual 
are fundamental and inallienable rights 
which cannot be destroyed nor diminished 
by legislative act, or failure to act1 and 
the duty of seeing that such rights are 
protected and preserved inYiolate falls 
squarely upon shoulders of judiciary, and 
the preformance of the duty is one of the 
inherent powers of the court." State v. Briggs, 
255 F. 2d 1055 (1953). 
"A judgment not void on its face ma.1 be 
attacked on ground that prisoner did not 
completently and intelligently waiYe right 
guaranteed to him under Federal and State 
Constitutions to have aid of counsel befor• 
entering plea of guilty." Wilken v. Squier, 
309 P. 2d 746; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
v. Claudy, 76 S.Ct. 223 (1955). 
Appellant submits that the Juvenile Court waa 
without authority or Jurisdiction to dispose of 
his constitutional rights and guarantees to have 
a preliminary hearing and the aid of legal counsel. 
Appellant was a juvenile delinquent who had been 
illegally arrested without a warrant and detained 
in the Sevier County Jail in violation of his 
Federal and State Constitutional Rights and 
Guarantees. In defiance of such unlawful and 
unconsittutional actions as complained of, there 
is no need for Appellant to cite the great array 
of authorities condemning such treatment. Justice 
for the Appellant (protection of his rights) alone 
- 15 ~~~~~~~-----------------
is sought. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the 
lower court erred in den7ing his application for 
habeas corpus, and a reversal of the lower court's 
ruling should be had, appellant should be dis-
charged from conviction and a new trial ordered 
in the instant case. Appellant urges that this 
court reverse and remand the cause. 
Respectfull1 submitted, 
